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The rapidly increasing wealth of genomic data has 
driven the development of tools to assist in the task of 
representing and processing information about 
genes, their products and their functions. One of the 
most important of these tools is the Gene Ontology 
(GO), which is being developed in tandem with work 
on a variety of bioinformatics databases. An exami-
nation of the structure of GO, however, reveals a 
number of problems, which we believe can be re-
solved by taking account of certain organizing prin-
ciples drawn from philosophical ontology. We shall 
explore the results of applying such principles to GO 
with a view to improving GO’s consistency and co-
herence and thus its future applicability in the auto-
mated processing of biological data.   
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important tools for the representation 
and processing of information about gene products 
and functions is the Gene Ontology (GO).1 GO is be-
ing developed in tandem with work on a variety of 
biological databases within the framework of the 
umbrella project OBO (for: open biological onto-
logies).2 It provides a controlled vocabulary for the 
description of cellular components, molecular func-
tions, and biological processes.  
Representatives from a number of groups work-
ing on model organism databases, including FlyBase 
(Drosophila), the Saccharomyces Genome Database 
(SGD) and the Mouse Genome Database (MGD), in-
itiated the Gene Ontology project in 1998 in order to 
provide a common reference framework for the asso-
ciated controlled vocabularies.3 
As of June 19, 2003 GO contains 1297 compo-
nent, 5396 function and 7290 process terms. The total 
number of GO informal term definitions is 11020. 
Terms are organized in parent-child hierarchies, indi-
cating either that one term is more general than an-
other or that the entity denoted by one term is part of 
the entity denoted by another. 
Database compilers create associations between 
GO terms and entries for genes or gene products in 
their databases in order to describe the processes in 
which the latter are involved. Typically, such associa-
tions (or ‘annotations’) are first of all established 
electronically and later validated by a process of 
manual curation which requires the annotator to have 
expertise both in the biology of the genes and gene 
products and in the structure and content of GO. 
GO AND ONTOLOGY 
The Gene Ontology, in spite of its name, is not an 
ontology as the latter term is commonly used either 
by information scientists or by philosophers. It is, as 
the GO Consortium puts it, a ‘controlled vocabulary’. 
Information scientists tend to view ontologies as ter-
minologies with which axioms and definitions are as-
sociated, formulated (for example in some Descrip-
tion Logic framework) in ways which make them 
suitable for supporting software applications. Philo-
sophers generally regard ontologies as theories of the 
different types of entities (objects, processes, rela-
tions) existing in given domains.4 Where information 
systems ontologists seek to maximize reasoning effi-
ciency even at the price of simplifications on the re-
presentational side, philosophical ontologists argue 
that both logically rigorous formalization and repre-
sentational adequacy can bring benefits both for the 
stability of an ontological framework and for its ex-
tendibility in the future. 
GO’s primary focus is not ontological in either 
sense. Certainly it uses hierarchies of terms. But its 
authors have focused neither on software implemen-
tations nor on the logical expression of the theory 
encompassing these terms. Rather their efforts have 
been directed toward providing a practically useful 
framework for keeping track of the biological anno-
tations that are applied to gene products.5  
This means that when faced with the trade-off be-
tween (1) formal and ontological coherence, stability 
and scalability, and (2) the speedy population of GO 
with biological concepts, preference was given by the 
GO consortium to the latter. Too little attention was 
thereby paid to the significance of those ontological 
or quasi-ontological terms – such as function, part, 
component, substance, action, domain, complex – 
which were employed in GO’s construction.  
   
GO, GONG and Protégé-2000: GO’s success in 
serving the biological community has led some re-
searchers to attempt to expand its utility by using GO 
in tandem with bioinformatics applications. Some are 
now seeking to use GO as a basis for replacing 
manual comparison of the properties of sets of gene 
products with automatic reasoning. The Gene Onto-
logy Next Generation (GONG) project6 is attempting 
to improve GO’s suitability for use by computers by 
rendering GO in a description logic.7 Another effort 
applies the Protégé 20008 frame-based9 ontology 
editor and associated tools to browse and edit GO and 
to verify certain kinds of consistency within GO.10 
All of these efforts, however, accept GO as it is, 
and seek to supplement it with formal reasoning 
tools. Here, in contrast, we show that the existing 
architecture of GO harbors problems which stand in 
the way of such formalizing efforts. We show how, 
by taking account of certain organizing principles 
drawn from philosophical ontology, GO’s consist-
ency and coherence and thus its future applicability in 
the automated processing of biological data might be 
enhanced. 
The Need for Expert Knowledge: One problem 
faced by GO’s curators is that “Many molecular func-
tions and biological processes do not exist in all 
organisms”.5 For example, only certain kinds of 
organisms have the cellular component known as gly-
cosome; only certain kinds of organisms are suscep-
tible to budding. Sometimes the needed supplemen-
tary information is included in a GO term’s defini-
tion, but where such information is not included one 
must rely on manual inspection and expert know-
ledge to determine under what set of conditions GO’s 
stated relations are applicable (e.g. that glycosome is 
part-of cytoplasm only for Kinetoplastidae). This 
places severe obstacles in the way of using GO as a 
basis for computer applications; for the latter do not 
have access to expert knowledge about how relations 
stated with perfect generality in GO should have their 
applications restricted in specific contexts.  
GO’s TRIPARTITE ARCHITECTURE 
GO is divided into three disjoint term hierarchies: the 
cellular component, the molecular function, and the 
biological process ontologies.  
The Cellular Component Ontology: The vocabu-
lary of GO’s cellular component ontology consists of 
terms such as flagellum, chromosome, ferritin, extra-
cellular matrix and virion. This ontology is the GO 
counterpart of anatomy within the medical frame-
work. It is intended to allow biologists to note the 
physical structure with which a gene or gene product 
is associated. GO includes in this vocabulary both the 
extracellular environment of cells and the cells them-
selves (that is, cell is subsumed in GO by cellular 
component). Cellular components are physical and 
measurable entities. They are, in the terminology of 
philosophical ontology, substances or independent 
continuants (things, or objects). They endure through 
time. 
The Molecular Function (Activity) Ontology: The 
GO definition of molecular function is: “the action 
characteristic of a gene product.” Molecular function 
accordingly subsumes terms describing actions, for 
example ice nucleation, binding, or protein stabil-
ization, entities which do not endure but rather occur. 
Until recently the reading of “function” as meaning 
action was beset by some confusion in virtue of the 
fact that the molecular function hierarchy includes 
terms such as anti-coagulant (defined as: “a sub-
stance that retards or prevents coagulation”) and 
enzyme (defined as: “a substance … that catalyzes”), 
which refer neither to functions nor to actions but 
rather to substances. This confusion has been rem-
edied to a degree by a policy change effective as of 
March 1, 2003 whereby “All GO molecular function 
term names [with the exception of the parent term 
molecular function and of the whole node binding] 
are to be appended with the word ‘activity’.”3 Thus 
the change solves problems with terms such as struc-
tural molecule, which is defined as meaning: “the 
action of a molecule that contributes to the structural 
integrity”. As “molecule” is normally used, of course, 
the term structural molecule refers not to an action, 
but rather to that which performs an action. However, 
because only names have been changed, but not asso-
ciated definitions, some inconsistencies still remain. 
The Biological Process Ontology: A biological pro-
cess is defined in GO as: “A phenomenon marked by 
changes that lead to a particular result, mediated by 
one or more gene products”. Biological process terms 
can be quite specific (glycolysis) or very general 
(death). Molecular function and biological process 
terms are clearly closely interrelated. The process of 
anti-apoptosis, for example, certainly involves the 
molecular function now labeled apoptosis inhibitor 
activity. GO’s curators attempt to clarify the relation-
ship as follows: “A biological process is accomp-
lished via one or more ordered assemblies of molecu-
lar functions.”11 This would suggest that molecular 
functions are initiators of biological processes – “act-
ivity”, unlike “process”, connotes agency. But it 
would suggest also that they stand to such processes 
in a part-of relation. At the same time, however, 
GO’s authors insist that part-of holds only between 
entities within a single hierarchy and never between 
the three GO vocabulary sets, and in general they 
   
have provided too little guidance as to the role of the 
different sorts of temporal entities within their 
ontology as also as to the relations between the three 
term-hierarchies by which GO is constituted. We 
shall return to these problems below. 
ONTOLOGICAL DISTINCTIONS 
As GO increases in size and scope, it will, as the GO 
Consortium accepts, “be increasingly difficult to 
maintain the semantic consistency we desire without 
software tools that perform consistency checks and 
controlled updates”.5 As the Gene Ontology expands, 
therefore, and thus becomes more useful to re-
searchers, its semantic integrity will at the same time 
become more difficult to maintain through manual 
inspection and curation. The addition of each new 
term will require the curator to understand the entire 
structure of GO in order to avoid redundancy and to 
ensure that all appropriate linkages are made with 
other terms. One method to improve on the current 
approach would be to make explicit the criteria used 
for discriminating subclassifications by introducing a 
decision-tree methodology into the construction of 
each hierarchy. This would involve the recording of 
explicit statements as to the basis for given clas-
sification choices and thus enable retrospective 
checking. In addition, it would facilitate the more re-
liable identification of concepts already in the ontolo-
gy.12 We believe, however, that to reap the full bene-
fits from this methodology certain distinctions drawn 
by philosophical ontologists need to be kept in mind: 
Universals vs. particulars: Philosophers distinguish 
between universals (also called kinds, species, types) 
and particulars  (also called individuals, exemplars, 
instances, tokens). Examples of universals are: the 
species E. coli, the function: to boost insulin 
production. Examples of particulars are: the E. coli 
bacterium now existing in this Petri dish, the function 
of this gene to boost insulin production in these beta 
cells in your pancreas. GO terms correspond, in 
philosophical terminology, to universals, that is to 
entities which are multiply instantiable. Thus the uni-
versal corresponding to the term Cell is instantiated 
by every actual cell.  
Continuants vs. Occurrents: Orthogonal to the dist-
inction between universals and particulars is that be-
tween continuants and occurrents. Continuants, as 
the name implies, are entities which continue to exist 
through time. Organisms, cells, chromosomes are all 
continuants: they preserve their identity from one 
moment to the next, even while undergoing a variety 
of different sorts of changes. The parts of continuants 
– for example your arms and legs – are also continu-
ants. The principal mark of a continuant is that, if it 
exists at a time, then so also do all its parts. 
 Occurrents (also called events, processes, activi-
ties) are in contrast never such as to exist in full in a 
single instant of time; rather, they are such as to un-
fold themselves in their successive phases, in the way 
in which, for example, a process of viral infection 
unfolds itself through time. Processes characteristi-
cally have a beginning, a middle and an end. Where 
your arm is part of you, your youth is part of that 
process which is your life. Note that part-whole 
relations never cross the continuant/occurrent divide. 
Dependent vs. Independent: Some entities (planets, 
people, molecules, atoms) have an inherent ability to 
exist without support from other entities. Others 
require such support in order to exist: a viral infection 
is dependent upon a virus and upon the organism 
which is infected; the function of an organ is de-
pendent upon the existence of the organ. 
Continuants and Occurrents in GO: The continu-
ant/occurrent opposition corresponds in first approxi-
mation to the distinction between substances (objects, 
things) and processes. GO’s cellular component onto-
logy is in our terms an ontology of substance uni-
versals; its molecular function and biological process 
ontologies are ontologies of function and process 
universals. But functions, too, are from the pers-
pective of philosophical ontology continuants. For if 
an object has a given function – which means a token 
function – for a given interval of time, then this token 
function is present in full at every instant in this 
interval. It does not unfold itself in phases in the 
manner of an occurrent. If, however, the token 
function gets exercised, then the token process that 
results does indeed unfold itself in this manner. Each 
function thus gives rise, when it is exercised, to pro-
cesses or activities of characteristic types.  
It is tempting, in light of this, to conceive the 
relation between GO’s molecular function hierarchy 
and its biological process hierarchy as one of function 
to exercise of function. Biological processes would 
then be accomplished when assemblies of molecular 
functions are exercised in ways which reflect the as-
semblies of cellular components which the given 
functions are the functions of. A further advantage of 
this solution is that it allows us to do justice to the 
fact that a function continues to exist even when dor-
mant or is for some other reason not being exercised. 
The relabeling step of March 2003makes clear, 
however, that a solution along these lines is not what 
GO’s authors have in mind. Relabeling ‘functions’ as 
‘activities’ signifies that GO’s authors hold molecular 
functions to be occurrent rather than continuant enti-
ties. But if this is so, then for clarity’s sake they 
   
should take the further step of relabeling the molecu-
lar function hierarchy a molecular activity hierarchy. 
If we understand this relabeling step correctly, 
‘function’ in fact means functioning, it signifies the 
function as exercised rather than as the potential to be 
exercised. Thus to assign a function/activity to a gene 
product is not necessarily to assert that this product 
possesses at all times the potential to perform the 
given activity. On the other hand however the GO In-
troductory Documentation11 still states that ‘Mole-
cular function defines the tasks that a physical gene 
product (or gene product group) does or has the po-
tential to do.’ (Emphasis added) We believe that GO 
here considers ‘potential’ to indicate the ability to 
perform a given activity under appropriate circum-
stances.  For instance, a transporter protein complex 
would not be expected to demonstrate transporter 
activity when the substrate it transports is not present. 
Thus when all molecular function nodes have been 
relabeled as activities, the term ‘activity’ still does 
not mean ‘activity’, but rather (something like): 
potential for activity under certain circumstances. 
 We believe that the failure to resolve such 
problems reveals itself in coding errors, for instance 
in the definitions of terms such as transporter (GO: 
0005215). Currently (June 19, 2003) this is defined 
as: “Enables the directed movement of substances 
(such as macromolecules, small molecules, ions) into, 
out of, or within a cell.” Transporter activity, 
however, would more properly be defined as this 
directed movement itself, or better still: as the 
catalysis of this movement.  
But now again: how are we to resolve the prob-
lem of the relation between the molecular function 
and the biological process hierarchies? The solution 
in terms of function and exercise is no longer avail-
able, yet given that part-whole relations are not 
allowed to traverse GO hierarchies, we do not know 
what solution could replace it. 
Dependent and Independent Entities in GO: 
Where GO’s cellular component ontology contains 
terms denoting independent entities, its function/acti-
vity terms denote dependent entities, which means 
entities which have a necessary reference to the sub-
stances in which they inhere. Thus a binding func-
tion/activity is dependent on the several molecules 
(or molecule parts) involved when binding occurs.  
 The biological process hierarchy, too, encom-
passes dependent entities. These are occurrents that 
require support from some substance in order to 
allow them to occur. Consider for example the term 
germination (GO:0000844), defined as “The physio-
logical and developmental changes by a seed, pollen 
grain, spore or zygote that occur after release from 
dormancy”. Here it is evident that the process of 
germination can only be expressed by means of some 
substance. Another clear example is viral life cycle 
(GO:0016032), defined as: “A set of processes by 
which a virus reproduces”.  
GO RELATIONS 
The Relation isa: Although GO documentation re-
fers to isa as meaning instance of,13 the isa relation is 
clearly used in such a way to indicate is a kind of or 
specialization relations between universals (e.g., “a 
eukaryotic cell is a cell”), rather than instantiation 
relations between particular entities and their 
universal kinds. The isa relation is distinct also from 
the relation of part to whole. Confusingly, however, 
isa is sometimes also used with the meaning part-of, 
as in the definition of lysosomal hydrogen-transport-
ing ATPase V0 domain (GO:0046610), which treats 
the V0 and V1 domains as kinds of V-type com-
plexes, rather than as component parts thereof. We 
believe that such errors derive, again, from a lack of 
attention to ontological principles. 
 The isa relation in its intended meaning indicates 
a necessary relationship. That is, when we say “euka-
ryotic cell isa cell”, we mean that every eukaryotic 
cell is a cell. However, there are cases in GO where 
isa is used to indicate non-necessary subsumption. 
For example, the term transport was defined in GO 
(as of June 19, 2003) as meaning: “The directed 
movement of substances (such as macromolecules, 
small molecules, ions) into, out of, or within a cell.” 
The term cell motility as: “Any process involving the 
controlled movement of a cell.” The term cell growth 
and/or maintenance as: “Any process required for the 
survival and growth of a cell.” Now, however, the 
first two are connected by isa to the last. The GO 
statement: transport isa cell growth and/or mainten-
ance, is to be read as indicating that every transport 
process is a cell growth and/or maintenance process, 
which is however not true of transports such as viral 
intracellular protein transport (GO:0019060).  
The Relation part-of: The intended meaning of part-
of, as explained in the GO Usage Guide, is: “can be a 
part of, not is always a part of”. In addition, the 
part-of relation is intended to behave transitively.13 
GO uses part-of for representation of parts of both 
substances and processes (e.g. activation is part-of 
fertilization) and of functions/activities. Part-of ap-
pears also in each of the following kinds of state-
ments: 
– membrane part-of cell, intended to mean “a mem-
brane is a part-of any cell” 
– flagellum part-of cell, intended to mean “a flagel-
lum is part-of some cells” 
   
– replication fork part-of cell, intended to mean: “a 
replication fork is part-of the cell (nucleoplasm) only 
during certain times of the cell cycle” 
– regulation of sleep part-of sleep, which should be 
corrected to: “regulation of sleep is co-located with 
and is causally involved with the sleep process”. 
We believe that each of these usages should be 
represented as a different relation, and that the system 
of relations involved should be explicitly presented. 
This means also extending the ontology to take ex-
plicit account of the notion of time and of the ways in 
which time is involved for example in determining 
different part-of relations. A revision along these 
lines will in addition bring much greater adaptability 
to the purposes of automated reasoning about dyna-
mic aspects of biological phenomena.  
CONCLUSION 
Benefits of the GO Approach: The GO approach 
has brought considerable benefits: 
1) Work on populating GO could start immediate-
ly, without its authors needing to solve some of the 
intricate problems which face ontologies when for-
malized as logical theories. 
2) Populating GO does not require the completion 
of complex protocols of formally determined steps 
but can be done intuitively by the expert biologist.  
3) There are few formal constraints standing in 
the way of easy incorporation of existing controlled 
vocabularies from the biological domain. 
4) The principle of unique identifiers allows GO 
terms to be used for database annotation without con-
sideration of their place in the GO hierarchy. 
Drawbacks of the GO Approach: Focusing on the 
rapid population of GO has, however, had its draw-
backs:  
1) It is unclear what kinds of reasoning are per-
missible on the basis of GO’s hierarchies.  
2) The rationale of GO’s subclassifications is un-
clear. The reasoning that went into current choices 
has not been preserved and thus cannot be explained 
to or re-examined by a third party. 
3) No procedures are offered by which GO can be 
validated.  
4) There are insufficient rules for determining 
how to recognize whether a given concept is or is not 
present in GO. The use of a mere string search pre-
supposes that all concepts already have a single stan-
dardized representation, which is not the case.  
A Modest Proposal. Our work here has consisted of 
no more than an initial analysis of GO terms and org-
anization with respect to some basic ontological dis-
tinctions. Our proposal is to use these basic distinc-
tions to determine a revised upper-level ontology for 
GO in which the relations between the three existing 
hierarchies and the roles of GO’s central ontological 
notions (including the various existing uses of part-
of, as also of process¸ action, activity, etc.) would be 
clearly specified and branches transplanted or divided 
accordingly. At the same time, definitions should be 
formulated in a way that records the conditions under 
which stated relations are applicable. 
It is no easy to task to determine how large an 
intellectual investment this proposal would require 
(although some necessary steps – for instance the 
substitution of “activity” for “function” in the name 
of GO’s molecular function ontology – would involve 
no cost at all). We are however convinced that the 
benefits will significantly outweigh the costs 
involved. For as ever more biological concepts come 
to be represented formally, the introduction into GO 
of a robust ontological architecture along the lines 
here suggested would: 
1) help to avoid coding errors,  
2) ensure that computer systems will be able to 
assume more of the burden of ontology curation, 
3) ensure that such systems are better able to use 
GO as a basis for automated  reasoning, 
4) facilitate GO’s interoperability with other bio-
logical databases and terminology systems and with 
associated ontologies.  
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